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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts interpreting the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA) must wade through a muddy mixture of policies and
precedent to reach decisions, but that is common to federal Indian
law. What makes their task even more “gut-wrenching”1 are the
people at stake, children and parents involved in contested
adoptions that “cut at the heart of the most sacred, essential
institutions of our society—the family.”2 Nevertheless, courts
regularly upheave families in messy adoptions. ICWA cases are
1. In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 1, 417 P.3d 1, 4.
2. Id. ¶ 91, 417 P.3d at 32 (Lee, J., dissenting).
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truly unique because of the added weight of preventing the
disruption of a child’s connection to another institution—her tribe.
This relationship, which has “no parallel in other ethnic cultures
found in the United States[,]” is equally sacred.3 It is also far rarer.
Despite the guidance of ICWA (a statute that in part requires states
to account for tribal rights in child placements) courts struggle to
understand, respect, and accommodate child-tribal relationships.
Artists and poets are better suited to explore the boundaries and
meaning of human relationships, but legislatures and courts must
necessarily delineate them. ICWA defines parent as “any biological
parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has
lawfully adopted an Indian child, including adoptions under tribal
law or custom. It does not include the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.”4 Congressional
silence has left courts the responsibility of determining what qualifies as acknowledging or establishing paternity for unwed fathers. In
response, state courts have not adopted one standard but three.
Most expect unwed fathers to fulfill the state laws regarding
acknowledging or establishing paternity to qualify as a parent under
ICWA. Others use state law as a guideline by which to judge a
father’s efforts but adopt a standard that allows fathers to imperfectly comply.
The third standard for establishing paternity, a federal reasonableness standard, was recently announced by the Utah Supreme
Court on August 31, 2017. In re Adoption of B.B. concerned the
contested adoption of the child (B.B.) of two unmarried, enrolled
members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.5 Prior to the child’s
birth, Birth Father supported Birth Mother on the reservation in
South Dakota, but once she moved to Utah in the summer of 2014
she ceased contact with him.6 Upon B.B.’s birth in August, Birth
Mother relinquished her parental rights and gave consent to
adoption.7 Additionally, on official documents she misrepresented
that her brother-in-law was the biological father and that he was

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969 (Utah 1986).
25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012).
Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 4, 417 P.3d at 5.
Id. ¶ 5, 417 P.3d at 5.
Id. ¶ 6, 417 P.3d at 5.
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not a member of a tribe.8 The brother-in-law relinquished his
purported parental rights and consented to the adoption without
Birth Father’s awareness the child was even born.9
Birth Mother proceeded with the adoption, but once she
returned to South Dakota she informed Birth Father of her misrepresentation.10 After contacting the tribe, adoption agency, and state,
Birth Father motioned to intervene to establish paternity on
December 31, 2014.11 After a series of motions from the tribe, birth
parents, and adoptive parents, the district court denied Birth
Father’s motion to intervene because it found he was not a parent
under ICWA for failing to file his court affidavit, file notice of
paternity proceedings, and offer to pay for Birth Mother’s pregnancy expenses before Birth Mother executed her consent for
adoption.12 His untimeliness under state law disqualified him from
receiving the additional parental protections of ICWA.13 Birth
Father then appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.
The Utah Supreme Court found that Birth Father did
acknowledge paternity under ICWA and therefore was a parent.14
However, the majority used a different standard than the district
court.15 Rather than requiring Birth Father to fulfill state law, the
Utah Supreme Court held his actions needed to pass a federal
reasonableness standard.16 Under this new standard, Birth Father’s
untimeliness was not dispositive when compared with the
evidence of his completion of all tasks required by state law for
paternity actions, his residence with Birth Mother during the
majority of her pregnancy, his “significant steps to care for his
unborn child, including financial support during Birth Mother’s
pregnancy,”17 his intentions to live with Birth Mother in Utah, and
his active involvement in the adoption proceedings.18
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8, 417 P.3d at 6.
Id. ¶ 9, 417 P.3d at 6.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121(3) (West 2017).
Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 12, 417 P.3d at 7.
Id. ¶ 49, 417 P.3d at 18.
Id. ¶ 51, 417 P.3d at 19.
Id. ¶ 71, 417 P.3d at 24–25.
Id. ¶ 82, 417 P.3d at 29.
Id. ¶ 74, 417 P.3d at 27.
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In contrast, the dissent would have continued to use the state
law standard because the dissenting justices construed acknowledge
and establish as legal terms of art that signal the use of the state law
standard.19 Under this reading, Birth Father’s incompliance with
state law for acknowledging paternity disqualified him as a parent
under ICWA.20
In re Adoption of B.B. raises critical questions about Congress’s
use of the words acknowledge and establish. Do the terms signify the
intent for courts to use existing state laws for determining paternity
or do they create a separate federal standard? The answer has
significant consequences for litigants: under a federal standard, this
biological father was granted the opportunity to intervene, which
potentially prevents the adoption of a child he wishes to keep. More
broadly, the answer will demarcate the boundaries of federal,
tribal, and state power.
The couple whose opportunity to adopt B.B. was curtailed by
In re Adoption of B.B. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court on December 29, 2017, but the Court
denied it on March 26, 2018.21 The highest court thus saved these
lingering questions for another day.
In the meantime, I answer these questions. I argue that under
current U.S. Supreme Court precedent, courts should be applying
a state law standard for acknowledging and establishing paternity
under ICWA. However, a state law standard does not sufficiently
advance the purpose of the statute, and it improperly balances the
rights of Indian children, parents, tribes, and the state. Thus,
Congress should amend ICWA to permit unwed fathers to establish paternity by either (1) fulfilling new federal requirements
enumerated in the amendment or (2) fulfilling the requirements of
their tribal law or custom.
In Part II, I provide the historical background of ICWA to
demonstrate why state institutions are a threat to the welfare of
Indian children and tribes. Part III contains the description of the
three different standards and the rationales for applying each. In
Part IV, I conclude that given the U.S. Supreme Court precedent of
using state law for undefined family law terms, the doctrine of the
19. Id. ¶ 170, 417 P.3d at 49–50 (Lee, J., dissenting).
20. Id. ¶ 202, 417 P.3d at 57.
21. R.K.B. v. E.T., 417 P.3d 1 (Utah 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1326 (2018) (mem.).
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separation of powers, and key distinctions from a Supreme Court
case that would suggest a federal standard, courts must currently
apply the state law standard for acknowledge and establish. Additionally, I present principles that Congress should include in an
amendment that would better fulfill its purposes in enacting ICWA
and respond to current amendment proposals.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Following centuries of federal policy aimed at assimilating
Native Americans into mainstream American society, Congress
found “that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are
broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children
from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an
alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in nonIndian foster and adoptive homes and institutions.”22
State courts were complicit, if not blatantly on the frontlines, in
the cultural war against Indian tribes.23 In response, Congress set
forth “minimum Federal standards”24 to protect Indian children,
parents, and tribes from “deliberate, collaborative abuse of the
child welfare system” such as when state institutions used “vague
allegations of poverty and neglect” to excuse their removal of
Indian children.25 ICWA’s procedural standards create space for
tribes to exercise their authority to determine what is in the best
interests of their members’ children and the survival of the tribe by
giving tribal courts (1) exclusive jurisdiction when the child is
domiciled on the reservation and (2) concurrent jurisdiction with
the states when the child is domiciled off the reservation.26 Parties
seeking “foster care placement of, or involuntary termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child must establish by stringent

22. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2012).
23. See id. § 1901(5) (“[T]he States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian

child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards
prevailing in Indian communities and families.”).
24. Id. § 1902.
25. Brief of Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians et al. at 1, Nat’l
Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 1:15cv00675) (citations omitted).
26. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)–(b).
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standards of proof that efforts have been made to prevent the
breakup of the Indian family” thus protecting against the arbitrary
use of state power.27 Substantively, ICWA also curtails the power
of states by requiring courts to follow placement preferences in
adoptive, foster care, and preadoptive placements. The child’s
extended family and tribe are favored first, followed by another
Indian tribe, and finally non-Indians.28
The federal government has a long history of constraining state
power over tribes.29 What is unusual about ICWA is the federal
government’s reach into domestic relations, an area usually
“belong[ing] to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the
United States.”30 The principle permitting each exercise of federal
power against the states or in favor of the tribe (or as is often the
case, in favor of the states and against the tribes31) is the trust
relationship between the federal government and tribes.32 Furthermore, Congress has plenary power over tribes that it uses to both
protect and abrogate tribal sovereignty. In this instance, Congress
“assumed the responsibility for the protection and preservation
of . . . [tribal] resources[,]” of which children are particularly “vital
to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes.”33
Many of ICWA’s additional protections are available only if a
party can meet the definition of parent in § 1903. The law provides
for court-appointed counsel if there is a finding of indigence, a
guarantee that the proceedings will be translated into a language
that the parent understands, the option to withdraw consent for
foster placements under state law, withdrawal of consent in
voluntary proceedings for termination of parental rights, objections
in transferring the case from state to tribal jurisdiction, the
opportunity to collaterally attack the termination of rights upon

27. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 57 (1989) (citations omitted).
28. 25 U.S.C. § 1915.
29. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Williams v.

Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515 (1832).
30. Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
31. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
32. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2).
33. Id. § 1901(2)–(3).
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consent being obtained through duress or fraud, and the ability to
petition if proceedings violate certain ICWA provisions.34
Even more significantly, if a father cannot establish paternity,
ICWA may not be applied to the proceedings at all if the disqualified father’s tribal membership is the only evidence that the child is
an Indian child.35 All the protections against the abuse of state law
that ICWA was meant to provide would be unavailable to the child,
the father, and the tribe. Litigants have compelling incentives to
argue that a father did or did not establish paternity. The recent
litigation crescendo over the standard used to acknowledge or establish paternity shows parties’ increased recognition of the standard’s importance and adds urgency to finding the right answer.36
The federal courts’ and agencies’ interpretations of ICWA are
central to its history. The U.S. Supreme Court provided foundational principles for analyzing ICWA’s definitions in Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield. Twenty-four years later, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor dissented in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl and
opined on the requirements for acknowledging and establishing
paternity. The federal executive branch addressed the definition in
the Bureau of Indian Affairs 2016 ICWA Guidelines. Discussion of
authority follows.

34. Id. §§ 1911–1914.
35. Brief for the Inter Tribal Council of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of

Respondents Birth Father and Cherokee Nation at 20–21, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570
U.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1308813 (“[If] an unwed father who has not technically
preserved his parental rights pursuant to state law would not qualify as a ‘parent’ under
ICWA, an otherwise involuntary proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1912 would be transformed
into a voluntary proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1913 merely by virtue of the mother’s
voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights to the Indian child. In such circumstances,
ICWA’s requirements for involuntary proceedings, including notice to the child’s tribe,
would arguably not apply. This result—the termination of parental rights to an Indian child
without notice to the child’s tribe, and over the objection of the child’s biological Indian
parent—is clearly not what Congress intended in crafting ICWA’s provisions.” (citation omitted)).
36. Of the nine cases related to the definition of acknowledging and establishing
paternity in appellate courts, four have been in the past ten years. See Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013); In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, 417 P.3d 1; Bruce L. v. W.E.,
247 P.3d 966 (Alaska 2011); Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
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A. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield was the first U.S.
Supreme Court case to address ICWA, twelve years after it was
passed.37 Its principles provide the foundation for the analysis in
future ICWA cases. The legal question was if the Court should
apply a state or federal definition of domicile to determine whether
the state of Mississippi could exercise jurisdiction over the
proposed adoption.38
The controversy arose because two enrolled members of the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians traveled 200 miles away from
their homes on the reservation for the birth of their twins.39 The
adoption of the twins was processed in the local chancery court and
the children were given to a non-Indian couple.40 The tribe under
ICWA, however, has exclusive custody proceedings over children
“who resid[e] or [are] domiciled within the reservation.”41 The tribe
motioned to vacate the adoption decree but was overruled.42
Eventually the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the chancery
court’s findings that the twins were not “domiciled” on the
reservation according to Mississippi state law because (1) they had
never been physically present there, and (2) they were “‘voluntarily
surrendered’ by their parents, who went to some efforts to see that
they were born outside the reservation and promptly arranged for
their adoption.”43 The Mississippi Supreme Court went to great
lengths to distinguish the case from state common law, which
dictates that the domicile of children follows their parents.44 The
result of the holding that the twins were not “domiciled” on the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 37.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012).
Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 38–39.
Id. at 38.
In re Guardianship of Watson, 317 So. 2d 30, 32 (Miss. 1975) (“The law is unchallenged that the residence of a minor is that of his parents and remains so during the period
of minority . . . .”); Stubbs v. Stubbs, 211 So. 2d 821, 824 (Miss. 1968) (“Quite clearly the
domicile established by the mother and father of the decedent in Natchez, Mississippi, in
1955 became the domicile of the minor child.”); Boyle v. Griffin, 36 So. 141, 142 (Miss. 1904)
(“His domicile being in Memphis, that also was the domicile of his children in the view of
the law.”).
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reservation is that parents of Indian children could thwart ICWA’s
guarantee that tribes can exercise jurisdiction over their most
vital resource.45
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Mississippi Supreme
Court’s decision concerning the source for the definition of domicile.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a uniform federal definition
applies because the use of individual state law “cannot be what
Congress had in mind when it used the term [domicile].”46 Although
the U.S. Supreme Court created a uniform federal definition, it still
drew upon “well-settled” state law to formulate Congress’s intent
for “a term it did not define.”47 It borrowed “established commonlaw principles of domicile to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the objectives of the congressional scheme.”48
The holding of the case, a straightforward rule that Indian
children take the domicile of their mother, is less significant than
the framework the U.S. Supreme Court developed for examining
the use of federal and state law within ICWA.49 First, courts look to
Congress’s purpose in protecting “the rights of Indian families and
Indian communities vis-à-vis state authorities.”50 Second, courts
determine if Congress intended uniform federal law to apply to the
question.51 Third, courts must balance the rights of the child, biological parents, adoptive parents, and tribe.52 Holyfield’s question of
domicile pitted the rights of Indian families against the rights of
tribes. In this instance, the rights of the Indian tribe superseded
those of the family.
The dissent by Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice Kennedy acknowledged the importance of looking to Congress’s purposes and applying uniform federal law.53 However, the
Justices formulated a different balance of tribal and familial rights.
From the Justices’ view, the “best interests of the child” and the

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

25 U.S.C. § 1901(3).
Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 47–48.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 45.
Id. 45–46.
Id. at 55–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.

1459

007.SMITH_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/6/19 2:38 PM

2018

“stability and security of Indian tribes and families” are not
represented when “the parents’ deliberate choice of jurisdiction” is
defeated.54 The Justices reasoned that because Indian parents
whose child is domiciled on the reservation can veto the transfer of
an action from state court to tribal court, a similar mechanism
should be available to parents of a child not domiciled on the
reservation to select “the forum . . . that most reflects the parents’
familial standards.”55
B. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
After Holyfield, the Supreme Court did not hear another ICWA
case until 2013. The convoluted facts of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
raised many legal questions, including the possibility that the birth
father was not a parent per § 1903(9).56 If he did not meet the
definition of parent, Adoptive Couple argued ICWA would be
irrelevant to the case; the Court could not apply protections of the
high standard of harm and remedial efforts to his case.57 However,
this critical question about the definition of parent went
unanswered. Because the Court did not need to decide if he was a
parent, it did not. For the sake of argument, it was assumed the
father qualified.58
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and
Scalia, issued a dissent that briefly addressed the question
anyway.59 Justice Sotomayor cited Holyfield to explain, “Congress
intended the critical terms of the statute to have uniform federal
decisions.”60 Later she reasoned, “[I]t is incongruous to suppose
that Congress intended a patchwork of federal and state law to
apply in termination of parental rights proceedings.”61 Even
though the position of the five majority justices regarding the parent
question is unknown, the presence of Justice Scalia in this dissent
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013).
Id. at 639–43.
Id. at 646–47.
Id. at 670–73.
Id. at 671 (citing Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 44–
45 (1989)).
61. Id. at 681.
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indicates that the federal standard could be upheld by conservative,
textualist judges as well.62
C. BIA Guidelines
Though most of the substantive debate about acknowledging or
establishing paternity has occurred in courts, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) has addressed the question through the agency’s rules
and Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act.63
The result is a slightly inaccurate restatement of state case law that
does not refine the answer.
The 1979 Guidelines did not provide any suggestions to state
courts for interpreting the definition of parent.64 The 2015 Guidelines added the following to the definition, “To qualify as a parent,
an unwed father need only take reasonable steps to establish or
acknowledge paternity. Such steps may include acknowledging
paternity in the action at issue or establishing paternity through
DNA testing.”65 The invocation of reasonableness reflects the recent
trend in case law toward less-rigid requirements. But significantly,
these guidelines do not have the force of law nor do they provide
the answer to the fundamental question: are these “reasonable
steps” a matter of state or federal law?
But one year later, the BIA backed away from adopting the
reasonableness standard in rules, which, unlike the guidelines,
bind agencies and courts. In anticipation of the 2016 rules, the
agency presented the results of the notice and comment period:

62. Because Justice Sotomayor’s writing on this question is dicta, my analysis is speculative. Justice Scalia may not have fully supported the argument about the question of establishing paternity and may have agreed to join the dissent based upon the first question.
Nevertheless, his choice to write separately and to join Justice Sotomayor suggests he agreed
with her key arguments, which may include her view of establishing paternity.
63. Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778 (June 14, 2016) (to be
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23).
64. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Welfare Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584
(Nov. 26, 1979).
65. Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 80
Fed. Reg. 10,146, 10,151 (Feb. 25, 2015).
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These commenters recommended language requiring an unwed
father to ‘‘take reasonable steps to establish or acknowledge paternity’’ and recommended listing examples of such steps to include
acknowledging paternity in the action at issue and establishing
paternity through DNA testing. Another commenter requested
clarification on when the father must acknowledge or establish
paternity, because timing impacts due process and permanency
for the child.66

However, despite the request for clarity by these commenters,
the BIA declined to address the manner and timing of acknowledging or establishing paternity:
The final rule mirrors the statutory definition and does not
provide a Federal standard for acknowledgment or establishment
of paternity. The Supreme Court and subsequent case law has
already articulated a constitutional standard regarding the rights
of unwed fathers . . . . Many State courts have held that, for ICWA
purposes, an unwed father must make reasonable efforts to
establish paternity, but need not strictly comply with State laws.
At this time, the Department does not see a need to establish an
ICWA-specific Federal definition for this term.67

Two contextual elements suggest why the BIA did not elucidate
the definition after recognizing a split in state courts. First, the
relatively few state cases about establishing paternity do not
provide a consensus,68 so the BIA may delay until one develops.
Second, the agency was aware of Justice Sotomayor’s 2013 dissent
in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl when it issued the guidelines. The
U.S. Supreme Court narrowly avoided the question of establishing
paternity in Adoptive Couple, but by addressing it in her dissent,
Justice Sotomayor effectively invited new litigation so that the
question can be resolved. Rather than promulgating something that
may soon be overturned by the Supreme Court, the BIA may leave
the debate to state courts.

66. Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,795–96 (June 14,
2016) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23).
67. Id. at 38,796 (citations omitted).
68. See e.g., Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (applying state law
but requiring imperfect compliance); In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d
925, 935 (N.J. 1988) (applying state law exactly).
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Of these historical authorities, Holyfield is the most important
source of law in answering the question of what it means to establish paternity under ICWA. Not only is it the solitary mandatory
federal authority but it also provides the key rationales for using
federal law in an ICWA context and supplies the most detail about
the interplay of statutory purpose with ICWA’s provisions.
III. THREE STANDARDS FOR ESTABLISHING PATERNITY
State courts have three responses to the question of what
Congress intended by using, but not defining, establish and acknowledge. The first is that courts interpret establish and acknowledge as
terms of art that signal the application of state law. Courts reason
that because there is no federal paternity law and because ICWA is
implemented in state institutions, fathers must establish paternity
by meeting the state standard. The second response is that ICWA
must invoke a federal standard because its primary purpose was to
protect Indian families against the unjust application of state law.
Because there is no specific federal paternity law, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the federal law is a reasonableness standard. The
displacing of state law with federal law has precedent in the U.S.
Supreme Court case Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.69
The In re Adoption of B.B. court addressed each option. The
dissent argued for a state law standard and the majority for a federal law standard. Notably, each opinion used the cases Jared P. v.
Glade T. and Bruce L. v. W.E., from Arizona and Alaska courts
respectively, to support its conclusion.70 However, Jared P. and
Bruce L. actually present a third response to the question of
Congress’s intent: imperfectly fulfilled state law. These courts
looked to state law for the requirements to establish paternity but
did not require Indian fathers to comply perfectly to qualify as a
parent under ICWA. Courts that use the imperfectly fulfilled state
law standard attempt to combine the best rationales from state law
and federal law standards.

69. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
70. Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d

966 (Alaska 2011).
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A. State Law Standard
State law is the most common standard courts use to determine
if a father acknowledged or established paternity under ICWA.
State courts of last resort in Oklahoma71 and New Jersey72 each
applied state law, with appellate courts in California73 and Texas74
doing so as well. Each state could have a different standard for
acknowledging and establishing paternity if its statutes uphold
minimum constitutional protections.75 Additionally, the New
Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that state law approaches must
be “permissible variations on the methods of acknowledging and
establishing paternity within the general contemplation of Congress when it passed ICWA.”76
While there are various state standards, there are also general
trends. State legislatures have broadly produced three types of laws
addressing paternity. First, circumstances are listed in which a man
is presumed to be the child’s father.77 One of those circumstances is

71. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985) (holding acknowledgement and establishment is accomplished through “procedures available through the
tribal courts, consistent with tribal customs, or through procedures established by state
law”), overruled by In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099 (Okla. 2004) (overruling In re Adoption of
Baby Boy D. for using the “existing Indian family” doctrine but not in the application of
state law).
72. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1988) (“[W]e
infer a legislative intent to have the acknowledgment or establishment of paternity determined by state law.”).
73. In re Daniel M., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 897, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“Moreover, because
the ICWA does not provide a standard for the acknowledgment or establishment of
paternity, courts have resolved the issue under state law.”).
74. Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 173 (Tex. App. 1995) (citing In re
Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1988)).
75. “[U]nwed fathers who grasp the opportunity to parent their biological children
have constitutionally protected interests equal to married parents and unwed mothers. On the
other hand, unwed fathers who have only a biological link to their children, and nothing
more, are not constitutionally entitled to the procedural protections given to married fathers
and mothers.” Brief of Family Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents
Birth Father and Cherokee Nation at 8–9, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013)
(No. 12-399). See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
76. Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d at 935.
77. For example, under the Utah statute, paternity is presumed when the putative
father is married to the mother when the child is born or if the child was born within 300
days of the termination of their marriage. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-204 (West 2017).
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when the father voluntarily acknowledges his paternity.78 The
second type of law therefore identifies these requirements as
acknowledgement. Acknowledgement “generally refers to a writing
by a father (with or without a requirement of consent by the
mother), where the writing itself has the legal effect of sustaining a
father’s parental rights to some degree.”79 An example of this
writing comes from the Uniform Parentage Act, promulgated by
the Uniform Laws Commissioners in 1975.80 A father acknowledges
paternity by filing the writing containing attested signatures of the
mother and father with the state agency maintaining birth
records.81 An acknowledged father is guaranteed the right to
“receive notice of court proceedings regarding the child,” the
opportunity to “seek visitation with the child, and usually will be
required to provide financial support to the child.”82 The third set
of laws provides an alternative to acknowledging paternity with
“the concept of an establishment of paternity, which is initiated by
a court filing and culminates in the issuance of a judicial order
(sometimes contested but not necessarily) establishing the father’s
parental rights and obligations.”83 Another frequent option for
establishing paternity is genetic testing.84
In Utah, a father can acknowledge paternity with a declaration
filed with the Office of Vital Records accompanied by a “written
and verbal notice of the alternatives to, the legal consequences of,
and the rights and responsibilities that arise from signing the
declaration.”85 The declaration of paternity is not valid if it is filed
or signed after consent or relinquishment to adoption has been
given.86 Establishing paternity is possible through a judicial or
78. See, e.g., id. § 78B-15-204(1)(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(A)(4) (2018); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 7-1106(1) (West 2018).
79. In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 170, 417 P.3d 1, 49–50 (citations omitted).
80. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 302, 304 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON U NIF.
STATE LAWS 2017).
81. Id.
82. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE RIGHTS OF
UNMARRIED FATHERS (2014).
83. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 170, 417 P.3d at 49–50 (Lee, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
84. See UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT art. 5 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON U NIF.
STATE LAWS 2017).
85. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-302(5) (West 2017).
86. Id. § 78B-15-302(8).
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administrative finding.87 The strictness of this timing would have
caused Birth Father in In re Adoption of B.B. to fail to acknowledge
paternity under state law.
The rationale for the application of state law is fourfold. First,
there is a strong presumption that “[a]ny time Congress acts . . . it
intends to respect the traditional boundaries between state and
federal power. That presumption is at its zenith in the area
of domestic relations given the traditional responsibility of the
States in such matters.”88 In using family law terms like acknowledge
and establish it can be assumed that state law definitions would
apply. This is demonstrated in De Sylva v. Ballentine, in which a
copyright renewal rights case turned on the definition of children.89
The court explained,
The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but that
does not mean that its content is not to be determined by state,
rather than federal law. This is especially true where a statute deals
with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of domestic
relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.90

The term children “requires reference to the law of the State
which created those legal relationships.”91 The court did not apply
state law without any qualifications though. It stated “[t]his does
not mean that a State would be entitled to use the word ‘children’
in a way entirely strange to those familiar with its ordinary usage,
but at least to the extent that there are permissible variations in the
ordinary concept of ‘children’ we deem state law controlling.”92
ICWA cases are squarely those of “domestic relations,” and the acts
of acknowledging and establishing paternity effectively regulate what
is a legally recognized familial relationship.
Justice Thomas Lee in In re Adoption of B.B. goes so far as to claim
that “the protection of the traditional jurisdiction of state courts
over adoption proceedings” was a “key countervailing purpose” of

87. Id. § 78B-15-601(1).
88. Brief for Petitioners at 14–15, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013)

(No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633597.
89. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
90. Id. at 580 (citation omitted).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 581.

1466

007.SMITH_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1451

5/6/19 2:38 PM

Establishing Paternity Under ICWA

ICWA.93 Though there is no direct expression of this purpose in the
text it could be inferred by comparing what the statute does and does
not do: “ICWA does not create an independent federal adoption
regime.”94 Other evidence of this preservation of states’ roles is in
the committee report: “the Committee does not feel that it is necessary or desirable to oust the states of their traditional jurisdiction
over Indian children falling within their geographic limits.”95
Second, the question about the standard for establishing
paternity raises issues of separation of powers. Congress is the
policymaker and courts interpret the law. To have state courts
determining what actions are sufficient to acknowledge and
establish paternity gives them too great a policymaking power.96 As
evident from ICWA and other family law cases, paternity questions
involve a careful balancing of state, parent, child, and societal
interests, and a legislature has the best tools to research the optimal
standard. Justice Lee emphasizes that this mingling of powers is
particularly unlikely because the federal Congress would not
delegate its policymaking power to a “judicial branch of another
sovereign—fifty sovereigns, really—in a field traditionally left to
that sovereign’s sole authority.”97
Third, Congress did not intend acknowledge and establish to be
applied uniformly. Holyfield recognized that state-law definitions of
statutory terms can be applied when “uniformity clearly was not
intended.”98 One such example is the statute at issue in the
copyright case, De Sylva, which explicitly draws upon family law
terms.99 Another is the statute at issue in Reconstruction Financial
Corp. v. Beaver County, a case in which Congress allowed “real
property” of an agency to “be subject to State, Territorial, county,
municipal, or local taxation.”100 The Supreme Court determined
that the state law definition of “real property” should apply, not the

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 159, 417 P.3d 1, 47 (Lee, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 160, 417 P.3d at 48.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 19 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7541.
Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 174, 417 P.3d at 51 (Lee, J., dissenting).
Id.
Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 44 (1989).
See supra text accompanying notes 89–92.
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 206 (1946) (citations omitted).
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federal definition. This is because of the congressional purpose and
state traditions:
Concepts of real property are deeply rooted in state traditions,
customs, habits, and laws . . . . To permit the States to tax, and yet
to require them to alter their long-standing practice of
assessments and collections, would create the kind of confusion
and resultant hampering of local tax machinery which we are
certain Congress did not intend.101

By using state law paternity terms that are “deeply rooted in
state traditions, customs, habits and laws,” Congress demonstrated
it intended no uniformity in the definitions of acknowledge and
establish. Furthermore, to require the state to apply two different
standards for establishing paternity, one for the parents of nonIndian children and one for the parents of Indian children, may
“create[] confusion and result[] [in the] hampering of local” family
law adjudications.
Fourth, even if uniformity is the congressional goal, a federal
reasonableness standard will not create uniformity across the various state courts. State law, at least, provides uniformity within the
state. The processes for acknowledging and establishing paternity
are recorded in statutes and upheld consistently across cases. In
contrast, reasonableness standards invite subjective interpretations
and particularly fact-specific analyses. Though it is extreme to
suggest that such a standard will “guarantee chaos and unpredictability,” it will likely create wide variation of what is reasonable
within and across jurisdictions.102 Having internal consistency
within each state is better for an Indian father. He has notice
through the statute of what is required for him to claim his rights.
He needs to do no case law research to determine if his actions are
reasonable. Additionally, state paternity statutes generally describe
the same basic processes. Acknowledging is a written statement by
the father submitted to a specified government office, and establishing is a judicial order. Variations from state to state are real, but
the actual differences are small. Thus, fathers can anticipate what
will be required of them in each state.

101. Id. at 210.
102. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 200, 417 P.3d at 56 (Lee, J., dissenting).
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B. Federal Law Standard
The federal standard is most clearly articulated and was formally adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in In re Adoption of B.B.
Neither ICWA nor other federal laws define precise procedures and
timing for acknowledging and establishing paternity, so the majority
created a uniform reasonableness standard for the terms.103 The
Utah Supreme Court uses case-specific examples of what is
reasonable but does little else to suggest what may qualify.
Furthermore, the court does not indicate if Birth Father’s actions
were sufficient because of their cumulative effect or if any were
independently adequate.
Writing for the majority, Justice Constandinos Himonas gave
weight to Birth Father’s following actions: (1) residing with the
birth mother before conception, (2) living with the birth mother for
six months after conception, (3) payment of the birth mother’s bills,
(4) conveying expectations that they would live together again even
after their contact ended, (5) hastily informing the tribe of the fraud,
(6) obtaining legal counsel, and (7) filing many documents asserting
paternity and intervention in the case.104 Under the plain meaning
of the terms acknowledge and establish, Birth Father had shown
“recognition” of the child and “attempts to be responsible” for the
child.105 Justice Himonas also emphasized that Birth Father had
“accomplished all of the tasks required by Utah’s [paternity]
statute” if it were not for the timing issues.106 This suggests that
state law requirements hold weight under a reasonableness
standard not simply because they are state law but because they are
concrete examples of effort to recognize and take responsibility for
the child.107
Although the Utah Supreme Court majority was the first to
articulate its reasoning for looking to federal law rather than state
law as the uniform federal reasonableness standard, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has also looked to the plain meaning of
ICWA terms to guide paternity decisions. Its analysis is even more
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.¶ 71, 417 P.3d at 24–26 (majority opinion).
Id. ¶ 74, 417 P.3d at 27.
Id. ¶ 52, 417 P.3d at 19 (citations omitted).
Id. ¶ 74, 417 P.3d at 27 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
Additionally, state law requirements are relevant because they would clarify
parental rights for non-ICWA contexts that would be solely governed by state law.
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sparse and indeterminate than the Utah Supreme Court’s, but it is
still instructive. The South Carolina court determined that ICWA’s
“plain terms” allowed a father to “acknowledge[] his paternity
through the pursuit of court proceedings as soon as he realized [his
child] had been placed up for adoption and establish[] his paternity
through DNA testing” even though these actions were not conducted in the time and manner required by state law.108 Here again
state law and court proceedings provide specific instances for the
father to show his responsibility for the child.
In contrast, merely requesting counsel and writing to the court
in objection to the child’s adoption may be insufficient to acknowledge paternity.109 Speculation may not be enough either.110
Thus, if other courts apply the federal reasonableness standard,
they would most likely consider the broad categories of (1) interactions with birth mother, (2) objective evidence of plans for future
interactions with the child, (3) the filing of traditional state
paternity paperwork, and (4) voluntary courtroom actions. These
would probably operate as a factor test, with the filing of traditional
state paperwork as the factor with the greatest weight. Meeting
state law requirements might always be sufficient, but unnecessary
because of all the other reasonable ways that fathers might choose
to recognize their children and show responsibility for them. A
father’s recognition, acceptance, and interest in developing a
relationship with his child outside state legal mechanisms has
significant weight in real relationships, and this standard allows his
efforts to count in the courtroom too.111

108. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 560 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 570 U.S.
637 (2013).
109. In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 313–14 (Ind. 1988).
110. In re Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d 228, 233 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983).
111. Justice Himonas’s hypothetical demonstrates this:
The [state law] standard would lead to absurd situations where an unwed father
who clearly has acknowledged or established paternity under ICWA would not
qualify under Utah law. Take, for example, a situation where a biological mother
abandons a child with the unmarried biological father. If the father acted as the
sole caretaker for his child, that would surely be a clear-cut case of
acknowledgement of paternity. But under Utah law, the father would not have
acknowledged paternity if he did not have a written agreement that the mother
had also signed. This would provide the father with fewer rights than a
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There are five reasons showing that Congress intended a
federal standard to apply to the terms establish and acknowledge.
First, there is a “general assumption that ‘in the absence of a plain
indication to the contrary, . . . Congress when it enacts a statute is
not making the application of the federal act dependent on state
law.’”112 In addition to case law describing this assumption,113 the
federalism division in the American legal system supports the
concept: the federal government should not have to rely on states
to carry out its enumerated powers. The presumption is stronger
when the word in question is a “critical term.”114 As domicile is
critical in Holyfield because it is related to ICWA’s “key jurisdictional provision,”115 so too acknowledge and establish are critical
because they relate to key stakeholders. ICWA balances the
interests of four parties: child, biological parents, adoptive parents,
and tribe. In some instances, the terms are especially critical
because the rights of the tribe are connected to the recognition of an
Indian father as a parent.116
Second, ICWA was designed to combat the abuses arising from
state law; to then rely upon state law to determine the rights of key
stakeholders is illogical. Courts express distrust of state authorities,

reasonability standard under ICWA. We believe a common-sense reading of
ICWA prohibits [this] strict interpretation.
Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 73, 417 P.3d at 26–27 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
112. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989) (quoting
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103, 119 (1983); NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S.
600, 603 (1971); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)).
113. See, e.g., Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119; Nat. Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. at 603; Jerome, 318
U.S. at 104.
114. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44.
115. Id. at 45.
116. Brief for the Inter Tribal Council of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents Birth Father and Cherokee Nation at 20, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S.
637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1308813 (“[If] an unwed father who has not technically
preserved his parental rights pursuant to state law would not qualify as a ‘parent’ under
ICWA, an otherwise involuntary proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1912 would be transformed
into a voluntary proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1913 merely by virtue of the mother’s
voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights to the Indian child. In such circumstances,
ICWA’s requirements for involuntary proceedings, including notice to the child’s tribe,
would arguably not apply. This result—the termination of parental rights to an Indian child
without notice to the child’s tribe, and over the objection of the child’s biological Indian
parent—is clearly not what Congress intended in crafting ICWA’s provisions.” (citation omitted)).
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including state courts, in providing for “the rights of Indian
families and Indian communities” when they cite the legislative
history and purpose of the statute.117 Justice Himonas in In re
Adoption of B.B. captured this rationale vividly: “We are loath to pour
state law back into ICWA when ICWA’s whole reason for being is to
drain, what in Congress’s view, is an inequitable swamp—
displacing state law on the matters on which ICWA speaks.”118
The existence of cases like Holyfield in 1987 show that even after
the passage of ICWA in 1978 state courts used state law to
undermine the rights of Indian tribes and parents. The Mississippi
Supreme Court held, apart from its analysis of domicile, that the
Holyfield adoption proceedings entirely “escape applicable federal
law on Indian Child Welfare.”119 This reasoning unashamedly
ignored the other statutory grounds upon which tribal courts could
intervene. Furthermore, by taking elaborate efforts to distinguish
the domicile of the twins from state precedent, the state court
majority revealed intentions to treat Indian families differently. The
state court’s willingness to contradict “generally accepted doctrine
[of] this country”120 to avoid applying ICWA demonstrates the
validity of Congress’s concern that state courts abuse Indian tribes
and families.121
Third, a federal standard fosters uniformity, while a patchwork
of state laws would not. Federal statutes are generally intended to

117. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44–45.
118. In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 65, 417 P.3d 1, 23.
119. In re B.B., 511 So. 2d 918, 921 (Miss. 1987), rev’d sub nom. Miss. Band of Choctaw

Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
120. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49.
121. Another example of the state courts taking efforts to avoid applying ICWA is the
existing Indian family exception. State courts imposed an extra-textual requirement
that exempts “application of the ICWA” in those cases where the Indian child’s
family has not “maintained a significant social, cultural, or political relationship
with [their] tribe.” . . . Where there is no Indian family to break up, either because
it never existed or had already broken apart prior to the custody proceedings,
courts reason that ICWA does not apply.
Shawn L. Murphy, The Supreme Court’s Revitalization of the Dying “Existing Indian Family”
Exception, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 629, 636 (quoting Barbara Atwood, Flashpoints Under the
Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J.
587, 625 (2002)). Twelve states applied the exception, but now only six do (Alabama, Indiana,
Missouri, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee). Id. A version of this doctrine was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013).

1472

007.SMITH_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1451

5/6/19 2:38 PM

Establishing Paternity Under ICWA

have national applicability.122 On the other hand, when courts find
that Congress intended a state-law definition of a term, the statutes
are often those where uniformity was clearly not intended.123
Congress found the violation of Indian rights across the United
States, and so the presumption for a nationally applicable solution
is not rebutted. The essential element of the solution is knowing
when to apply the heightened protections. If a father of an Indian
child is entitled to heightened protection of his rights in Minnesota,
why should he not have the same protections in Montana? The
Holyfield court found that “a statute under which different rules
apply from time to time to the same child, simply as a result of his
or her transport from one State to another, cannot be what Congress
had in mind.”124
Furthermore, there is a presumption of uniformity when the
application of state law would impair the federal program.125 One
example of the frustration of the federal program through the
application of state law is given in In re Adoption of B.B. Utah does
not allow a father to acknowledge paternity unless the mother gives
her signature. “Thus, in cases where the birth mother declines to
sign the declaration, the unmarried biological father is precluded
from acknowledging paternity under ICWA . . . .”126 He must
establish paternity, instead, under Utah’s notoriously strict laws.
Requiring him to meet this very high standard to receive “any
protection of his parental rights . . . ‘would to a large extent nullify
the purpose the ICWA was intended to accomplish.’”127
Fourth, “Congress can and does expressly state when it wants
a state or tribal law definition to apply.”128 The definitions of

122. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 43.
123. Id. at 44.
124. Id. at 46. See also Brief for Respondent Birth Father at 25–26, Adoptive Couple v.

Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1191183. (“At the time that Congress
enacted ICWA, state adoption-consent laws varied dramatically. Some States required the
unwed father’s consent only if he had established paternity according to the jurisdiction’s
own laws; others if he had established paternity under the laws of any jurisdiction; and still
others required him both to acknowledge paternity and to legitimate the child. Others did
not require his consent under any circumstances at all.” (citations omitted)).
125. Id. at 44.
126. In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 67, 417 P.3d 1, 24.
127. Id.
128. Id. ¶ 60, 417 P.3d at 21 (citations omitted).
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extended family member129 and Indian custodian130 expressly refer to
state law or tribal law. The lack of such specificity in the definition
of parent indicates that Congress “rejected the formulation
embodied in the neighboring provision.”131 This canon of interpretation harmonizes well with the presumptions that federal law will
not depend upon state law and that uniformity is intended. If these
presumptions are not reflective of Congress’s intention, then it has
the tools (which it has used) to apply state law. 132
Finally, the federal standard should be one of reasonableness
because of
the canon of interpretation that [states] where a statute is silent as
to the time or manner of a subject, [courts] presume a
reasonability standard—an approach that is consistent with
ICWA case law and has been applied by many states over many
years and many different topics of law.133

C. Imperfectly Fulfilled State Law Standard
The third standard, imperfectly fulfilled state law, is described
in Arizona and Alaska court cases. The Alaska case was cited by
Justice Himonas to provide precedent for imposing a federal
reasonableness standard in In re Adoption of B.B.134 The dissent
correctly counters that neither the Arizona nor Alaska case
explicitly establishes this federal standard;135 rather, the courts
write of state requirements imperfectly fulfilled. These cases
support the opposing two standards and yet provide no definitive
precedent, because each case hybridizes the reasonableness and
state law approaches.
The Arizona Court of Appeals created the imperfectly fulfilled
state law standard in Jared P. v. Glade T. The birth father successfully

129. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) (2012).
130. Id. § 1903(6).
131. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 60, 417 P.3d at 21 (quoting Craig v. Provo City, 2016

UT 40, ¶ 38 n.9, 389 P.3d 423, 431 n.9).
132. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6).
133. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 71 n.26, 417 P.3d at 25 n.26 (citing cases related to
contract performance, permitting licenses, winding up corporations, record keeping requirements, among others).
134. Id. ¶ 72 n.28, 417 P.3d at 26 n.28.
135. Id. ¶ 166 n.33, 417 P.3d at 49 n.33 (Lee, J., dissenting).

1474

007.SMITH_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1451

5/6/19 2:38 PM

Establishing Paternity Under ICWA

acknowledged paternity for the purposes of ICWA by (1) challenging the adoption agency’s petition seeking to terminate his
parental rights, (2) attempting to be present for the child’s birth,
(3) filing a paternity action in another state, (4) amending his outof-state action upon learning the adoptive parents’ intentions to
adopt, (5) writing letters to the juvenile court explaining he was the
father, (6) enrolling in the tribe and submitting a copy of his
membership to the court, and (7) complying with a court order for
a DNA test that identified him as the child’s biological father.136 He
“failed to comply formally” with the Arizona statutory requirements because he did not notify the mother that he had initiated a
paternity action within thirty days after receiving notice of the
adoption, but the court found that he still acknowledged paternity
under ICWA.137
Citing Jared P., the Alaska Supreme Court in Bruce L. v. W.E.
found that for purposes of ICWA “an unwed father does not need
to comply perfectly with state laws for establishing paternity, so
long as he has made reasonable efforts to acknowledge
paternity.”138 In this case the father failed to legitimate his son
within the year required by state law because birth mother did not
sign the forms; however, his filing of an “acknowledgement of
paternity and an affidavit of paternity with the superior court[,]”
“mov[ing] for custody and later . . . paternity testing[,]” and
“fil[ing] a separate suit for custody” of the child were sufficient for
ICWA parental recognition.139 The Alaska Supreme Court applied
a reasonableness standard, but the standard is not explicitly or
implicitly federal. However, I interpret it as implementing the
imperfectly fulfilled state law standard because its analysis is
firmly anchored in Alaska state statutes and court procedures.
These courts are silent as to how much flexibility a putative
father is accorded in meeting state requirements to satisfy ICWA.
Because each father’s failure to meet state requirements was related
to timing issues, it is unlikely that courts would hold it reasonable
to omit substantive actions. For example, failure to file all state
forms or failure to make court motions are probably fatal lapses in
136.
137.
138.
139.

Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157, 162 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 162–63; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (2017).
Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 979 (Alaska 2011).
Id. (alterations in original).
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fulfilling state requirements. Similarly, the courts gave no consideration to actions that fathers took outside the legal system. The
interpersonal interactions and intentions of the fathers were
apparently not a substitute for attempts to avail themselves of state
legal remedies to paternity questions for purposes of ICWA.
Thus, this third standard is a hybrid of the state law and federal
law standards. State law remains the root of the analysis and its
requirements are given the most weight. And there is an argument
that it is reasonable for courts to consider the father’s near-perfect
efforts to claim his child through the legal system as satisfying the
plain meaning of acknowledge and establish. This standard allows
courts to consider the proportionality of the father’s failure to
comply with the seriousness of its effects upon his and his
child’s lives.
Courts, legal professionals, and scholars have scarcely provided any rationale for the father’s imperfect fulfillment of state law
because (1) only two states have applied it and (2) these cases are
incorrectly cited as supporting a federal standard.140 Other than
purpose-based arguments, the support for imperfectly fulfilled
state law comes from the BIA Guidelines that suggest a liberal
interpretation of the law.141
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Upon review of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, I conclude that
the current standard for acknowledge and establish in § 1903(9) must
be supplied by state law. Nevertheless, policy concerns, the
purposes of ICWA, and the rationale of Holyfield should prompt
Congress to amend ICWA to create a federal standard that allows
for tribal variation in establishing paternity. In section A, I describe
the reasons for my conclusion that state law currently applies, and
in section B, I describe three principles that should guide Congress
as it fixes flaws that remain from the application of the state
law standard.

140. See Jared P., 209 P.3d at 157; Bruce L., 247 P.3d at 966; Indian Child Welfare Act
Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,796 (June 14, 2016) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23).
141. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg.
67,584, 67,586 (Nov. 26, 1979) (ICWA is “to be liberally construed”).
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A. Under Current Precedent, Courts Must Apply
the State Law Standard
Determining which standard’s rationales are stronger was not
an easy call. Because Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
is the most apposite and controlling precedent for this ICWA
definition issue, I determined that the key question is if the
definitions of acknowledge and establish were analogous to the definition of domicile.142 If they were sufficiently similar, then federal
law should apply. If they were distinguishable, then state law
should apply. They are distinguishable. Unlike federal domicile
law, there is no federal paternity law that courts can apply in the
alternative to state law. Without any existing federal law, it would
be inappropriate for state courts to create federal law to fill the gaps
in the statute because courts cannot adequately balance state, tribal,
parental, and child interests.
Concerns for federalism do not animate this conclusion.
Congress has plenary power over Indian tribes that extends to
aspects of life that for non-Indians only state law would apply.143
Certainly states “have an interest in child custody matters. But
under the Constitution, [s]tates have no interest in matters affecting
tribal membership or internal tribal relations.”144 Statutes relating
to Indian affairs cannot simply be balanced on the traditional scale
between state and federal interests; a third sovereign changes those
calculations. In many jurisdictional questions, the states’ authority
over tribes and Indians is not inherent and comes from congressional actions that abrogate tribal sovereignty and divest tribal
jurisdiction. Congressional regulation of the way states exercise
authority over Indians (and their children) is nothing new. If
Congress chooses to create federal paternity law relating to Indian
children, it has the power to do so. However, none of ICWA’s
provisions show that Congress created federal paternity law, and
without existing federal paternity law to draw upon, courts must
apply state law.

142. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
143. Examples include education, health care, alcohol regulation, property taxes,

tobacco sales, and criminal codes.
144. Brief for the Cherokee Nation at 53, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637
(2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1225770.
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The key to my conclusion is that the question of establishing
paternity is distinguishable from the question in Holyfield. The
application of federal law to an undefined term in Holyfield was
dependent upon the existence of federal law to substitute for
statutory silence. Domicile, acknowledge, and establish are each
critical terms of ICWA because of their determinative influence on
jurisdiction and the protections applicable to the case. However,
domicile is “a concept widely used in . . . federal . . . courts for
jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws purposes.”145 The presence of domicile in federal law meant that the Supreme Court could interpret law
rather than create it. And while the Court gave itself the option to
“draw[] on general state-law principles” to make its determination,
this really is no different than the traditional judicial process of
looking to persuasive authority.146 Furthermore, the Court had the
federal case Yarborough v. Yarborough regarding the domicile of
minors to guide its analysis.147 Acknowledge and establish have no
equivalent presence in federal case law.
The judiciary is not the body that should fill the gap and create
federal paternity law. The lawmaker must deliberate with exceptional care to define the critical, legal relationships between family
members. Even with attentive research and analysis, state legislatures have developed multiple valid approaches to paternity law.
A court is not in the position to weigh the various merits of each
paternity statute and pick the one that best represents the needs of
its constituents. That responsibility is constitutionally mandated
and most practically assigned to the legislature.148 It is illogical to
presume that Congress would use two words in a definition section
to delegate to state courts the power to determine federal paternity
law, especially when there was no existing federal law to
guide them.149

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 48.
Id. at 47.
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 211 (1933).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
This is not to say that the U.S. Supreme Court cannot address paternity questions.
It heard cases about due process of, and equal protection for, unwed fathers under state law
throughout the 1970s. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
The Court must make constitutional determinations, but its role is not to create the law.
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As with all tricky statutory interpretation cases, the answer is
ultimately a battle of presumptions. The presumption from De Sylva
is strongest: when Congress writes laws dependent upon familial
relationships it “requires a reference to the law of the State which
created those legal relationships.”150 Acknowledge and establish are
legal terms of art in a state-dominated area of law that do not
require even more specific invocations of state law.151
Additionally, the presumption that Congress would not use
state law because states were the culprit behind Indian child
removal can be rebutted because laws of paternity are objective and
of general applicability. Unlike questions that require courts to
define adequate parenting, which state courts were manipulating
and which was the initial target of ICWA,152 acknowledging and
establishing paternity are generally dependent upon paperwork
and genetic testing. This limits the opportunities for state court
abuse. If these requirements were to become onerous or unjust,
they would have a greater likelihood of being democratically
overturned because all residents, not just Indians, are affected
by them.153
The foregoing analysis presents the question as a decision
between applying state or federal law because that is where the
debate in the Supreme Court has centered. Nevertheless, courts
could apply the imperfectly fulfilled state law standard. This fails
not only because I have shown that state law applies, but also this
standard eliminates the benefits of the federal and state law
standards rather than multiplying them. By starting with state law
and then allowing untold variation in its application, Alaska and
Arizona courts effectively create no standard. An unworkable

150. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580–82 (1956).
151. See In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 188, 417 P.3d 1, 54 (Lee, J., dissenting);

Brief of Amici Curiae National Council for Adoption in Support of Petitioners at 7, Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 749938 (“Thus, an ‘acknowledgment of paternity’ remains a term of art in the context of establishing paternity.”).
152. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2012) (“[T]he States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have
often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”).
153. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Caban, 441 U.S. at 380;
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 246; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645.

1479

007.SMITH_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/6/19 2:38 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2018

standard, even in the guise of adhering to ICWA’s purpose, is
detrimental to Indian parents.
This standard still relies upon state law for its analysis, and thus
pours state law back into ICWA where Congress may have
intended to drain it.154 States still have wide variability in the
requirements for acknowledging and establishing paternity, and so
there would be no uniformity from state to state. Even within
jurisdictions, the reasonableness analysis creates a focus on specific
facts could lead to huge variations in outcomes. This is especially
likely because Jared P.155 and Bruce L.156 provide no guidance as to
which facets of the law require perfect or just reasonable
compliance. This adds an unnecessary complication for judges.
And although courts successfully apply the reasonableness standard in many contexts, those contexts are generally vaguer than the
specific state paternity statutes.157
The dissent in In re Adoption of B.B. highlights one problem of
having a standard that is too informal for establishing paternity
because of its implications for notice.
A family who wishes to adopt a child of Indian heritage has a
statutory duty to provide notice to any parent. But if parent
includes anyone who has vaguely acknowledged paternity in some
informal ways, the adopting family will have no way to know
how to fulfill its obligations under ICWA. And an Indian mother
would have no way of assuring that her child will actually be
given to the adoptive couple, even after her own parental rights
have been terminated. . . . Surely Congress didn’t mean to require
biological mothers and adoptive families to give notice to persons
whose acknowledgment of paternity was so vague and informal
that they cannot reasonably be identified.158

Therefore, this imperfectly fulfilled state law standard also
abandons the benefits of applying state law: notice, predictability,
and stability.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 65, 417 P.3d at 23 (majority opinion).
Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966 (Alaska 2011).
Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 71 nn.26–27, 417 P.3d at 25–26 nn.26–27.
Id. ¶ 172, 417 P.3d at 51 (Lee, J., dissenting).
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Such uncertainty as to which elements of the law are flexible
may also raise important questions of fairness and due process. If a
state’s requirements for acknowledging and establishing paternity
are constitutional, then it appears unjust for some fathers to be
required to perfectly comply while others are not. This is especially
true when the stakes are so high—the fundamental relationships of
parent to child and child to tribe. ICWA as a whole and in part has
sparked arguments of unconstitutionality, some of which allege
that Indians’ unique treatment by Congress is impermissibly
rooted in racial preference rather than political status.159 Applying
this standard could raise more of these questions because it appears
to grant paternalistic leniency to Indian fathers rather than help
fulfill the purposes of ICWA.
B. Principles to Guide the Amendment
Though Supreme Court precedent and legal presumptions
show that courts should currently apply state law to define acknowledge and establish, doing so is problematic for three reasons: (1) state
courts have historically abused their power to disproportionately
remove Indian children, (2) state law fails “to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families[,]”160 and
(3) an unwed father’s protections under ICWA could vary from
state to state. An amendment that creates federal paternity law for
ICWA contexts could rectify these issues. This amendment should
provide an Indian father with a choice to acknowledge and
establish his paternity by either fulfilling the enumerations of a
federal statute or invoking tribal law and custom.

159. See Brief for Petitioners at 17–18, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013)
(No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633597; Brief of Amici Curiae National Council for Adoption in Support
of Petitioners at 9–10, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013
WL 749938. See generally Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535 (1974).
160. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2012).
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1. Prevent state court abuse
As I’ve explained, 161 the risk for state court abuse of state paternity schemes is less than it is with other aspects of child welfare
law162 because the paternity statutes are generally specific and
objective. In the new federal paternity scheme, Congress should
follow that same pattern to combat any lingering opportunities for
state courts and institutions to abuse their power.
The Uniform Parentage Act is a good model163 because it
carefully enumerates the presumption of parentage,164 voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity,165 accommodations for genetic
testing,166 and alternative methods of establishing paternity.167 This
is not to say that parties will not find a way to litigate and dispute
issues of signatures, the efficacy of genetic tests, or the timing of
these elements. But having a clear statement of the law through
statute is preferable to a reasonableness standard because there is
less room for the fact finder to introduce subjectivity that harms the
rights of Indian fathers and tribes. A middle-class white father’s
genetic test is just as suspect as that of an Indian father.

161. See supra Sections III.A, IV.A.
162. Statutes that speak in generalities rather than giving concrete actions and dead-

lines create opportunities for state courts to establish precedent that disadvantages Indian
parents. Examples of this within ICWA include the debate over “good cause,” 25 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)–(b), and “active efforts,” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). See also Megan Scanlon, From Theory
to Practice: Incorporating the “Active Efforts” Requirement in Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings,
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629 (2011); Denise L. Stiffarm, The Indian Child Welfare Act: Guiding the
Determination of Good Cause to Depart from the Statutory Placement Preferences, 70 WASH. L. REV.
1151 (1995).
163. The Uniform Parentage Act focuses on the equality of parental rights. That
emphasis has led the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
update the Act in 2017 to reflect modern parents, considering Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015), which declared same-sex marriage a constitutional right, and including
surrogacy arrangements. While questions related to these types of paternity have not been
highly litigated within ICWA contexts, they are likely to be increasingly common. By
adopting some of these provisions, Congress could address the issues more efficiently than
leaving their resolution to courts.
164. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT art. II (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 2017).
165. Id. art. III.
166. Id. art. V.
167. Id. art. VI.
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2. Account for tribal custom
State law and courts’ current application of federal law do not
adequately account for tribal paternity law and customs. Justice
Himonas in In re Adoption of B.B. writes that it would be “unfair and
an unwarranted intrusion by states into Indian customs and
practices” to apply state law.168 But his implementation of a
uniform federal reasonableness standard contains no room for
variability per different tribal customs or codes. In fact, he explicitly
rejects such.169 This view is ultimately incompatible with the purpose of ICWA because accounting for tribal law and customs is the
best way to respect and protect Indian children, families, and tribes.
The use of tribal law to determine paternity is not a new idea.170
The New Jersey Supreme Court once concluded that
Congress intended to defer to state or tribal law standards . . . so
long as these approaches are permissible variations . . . within the
general contemplation of Congress when it passed the ICWA, and
provide a realistic opportunity for an unwed father to establish an
actual or legal relationship with his child.171

The Navajo Nation also advocates for the use of tribal law,
though it argues from the position that state law is the greatest
threat to tribal interests, not an acceptable alternative like the New

168. In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 69, 417 P.3d 1, 24.
169. Id. ¶ 70, 417 P.3d at 24 (“As with state law, the application of tribal law to the

definition of a parent under ICWA would result in a lack of nationwide uniformity. Based
on Holyfield, we determine that Congress could hardly have intended that result.”).
170. See Kevin Heiner, Are You My Father? Adopting a Federal Standard for Acknowledging
or Establishing Paternity in State Court ICWA Proceedings, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2151, 2168–69
nn.144–45 (2017) (citing comments by the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, Saint
Regis Mohawk Tribe, and Tulalip Tribes for the 2015 guidelines that recommend the use of
tribal law in the definition of “parent”); Comment Letter from Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians to Elizabeth Appel, BIA (May 19, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov
/document?D=BIA-2015-0001-1181 (“Re: Proposed ICWA Regulations”); Comment Letter
from Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe to Elizabeth Appel, BIA (May 19, 2015), http://www.
regulations.gov/document?D=BIA-2015-0001-1329 (“Re: . . . Regulations for State Courts
and Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceedings”); Comment Letter from Tulalip Tribes
to Elizabeth Appel, BIA (May 19, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIA
-2015-0001-0656 (“Re: . . . Regulations for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child
Custody Proceedings”).
171. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1988) (citations omitted).
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Jersey Supreme Court found.172 The tribe explains that using tribal
law harmonizes with Congress’s “underlying intent to infuse tribal
law and customs particular to family relations . . . into child welfare
matters involving Indian children.”173 Family relations are integral
to determining tribal membership, an area of law squarely within
tribal sovereignty.174 “Tribes’ sovereign powers to regulate membership would be frustrated if state law governed ‘paternity.’”175
Despite the discussion of applying tribal law, it is regrettable that
state courts have not seriously considered the option enough to
implement it.176
Congress’s recognition of the importance of incorporating tribal
law is evident in other provisions of ICWA. For example, extended
family member and Indian custodian are defined in terms of tribal
custom.177 Even more importantly, the role of the tribal court
throughout ICWA demonstrates Congress’s trust in tribes. Tribal
courts have the opportunity to “establish a different order of
preference”178 in the placement of children, and the standards used
in these decisions are the “prevailing social and cultural standards
of the Indian community in which the parent or extended family
resides or . . . [maintains] social and cultural ties.”179 Tribes are

172. Brief for the Navajo Nation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 10–11,
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1399374 (“States
could create laws in contravention of 25 U.S.C.A. § 1921 . . . to eliminate parental rights
altogether under ICWA.”).
173. Id. at 9.
174. See id. at 10.
175. Id.
176. It is understandable that the courts would lack this imagination, given the U.S.
Supreme Court precedent focusing on the interpretation of family law terms and Holyfield’s
emphasis on federal law uniformity. Nevertheless, tribal law is a logical choice for many
reasons. First, ICWA shows a strong preference for tribal courts with jurisdictional provisions. 25 § U.S.C. § 1911 (2012). These courts have expertise and the right to apply tribal
law rather than state law in many matters. Child welfare proceedings should not be the
exception when tribal courts must apply state law. And when the state is exercising its
concurrent jurisdiction over a child domiciled off the reservation, it is just as foreign to the
court to apply federal law as it would be to apply tribal law. Second, some tribal courts have
extensive experience applying ICWA. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare, PONCA TRIBE INDIANS
OKLA., http://ponca.com/indian-child-welfare.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2019); Cherokee
Nation Indian Child Welfare, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/Services/Indian
-Child-Welfare (last visited Jan. 14, 2019).
177. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2), (6).
178. Id. § 1915(c).
179. Id. § 1915(d).
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given, at a minimum, concurrent jurisdiction over child welfare
proceedings; their judgments are entitled to full faith and credit.180
Congress not only considered but also prioritized the use of tribal
law and custom; there is no reason that the determination of
paternity should be any different.181
It is impractical to defer entirely to tribal law for the definitions
of acknowledge and establish for the simple reason that not all 567
federally recognized tribes have laws addressing paternity. Tribes
that have well-developed legal systems like the Navajo Nation,182
St. Regis Mohawk,183 Snoqualmie,184 Northern Arapaho,185 or Spirit
Lake Nation186 have codes that are on point. Other federally
recognized tribes like the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,187
Cheyenne-Arapaho of Oklahoma,188 or Shingle Springs Band of
Miwok Indians189 may not have tribal codes or their codes do not
address the topic. If ICWA refers solely to tribal law as the standard
for acknowledge and establish, Congress would create even more
gaps; courts would have to decide yet again whether to apply state
or federal law in the absence of tribal law.

180. Id. § 1911.
181. The Navajo Nation argues that it is “commonsense for ICWA to defer to tribal laws

on family relations.” The question the tribe raises is a valid one: “Why would ICWA apply
tribal law or custom to determine who is an ‘extended family member’ but not to determine
who has acknowledged or established paternity to be a ‘parent’?” Brief for the Navajo Nation
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 11, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637
(2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1399374.
182. In re Guardianship of T.S.E.J., 10 Am. Tribal Law 57, 2011 WL 3625086 (Nav. Sup.
Ct. 2011).
183. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Family Support Act, https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/_up
loads/site_files/FINAL_DRAFT_-_Saint_Regis_Mohawk_Tribe_Family_Support_Act.pdf.
184. An Act Relating to Indian Child Welfare, 13 Tribal Council Act § 2, http://www.
snoqualmietribe.us/sites/default/files/icw_code_2015.pdf.
185. Family Support Ordinance, 10 Northern Arapaho Code, http://www.northern
arapaho.com/test2/sites/default/files/documents/files/NA%20Code%20Title%2010%20
Family%20Support%205-13-08.pdf.
186. Spirit Lake Nation Law and Order Code, Children’s Code, Resolution No. A05-03-160,
http://www.spiritlakenation.com/data/upfiles/media/Title_9_Domestice_Relations.pdf.
187. 9 Choctaw Domestic Relations Code, http://www.choctaw.org/government
/court/pdf/TITLE%2009%20DOMESTIC%20RELATIONS%20(rev%2010-11-2016).pdf.
188. CHEYENNE-ARAPAHO TRIBES OF OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS, http://
thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/Chyn_aph.html#art1.
189. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians Family Code, http://www.shingle
springsrancheria.com/ssr/wp-content/uploads/documents/codes/Family%20Code.pdf.
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Nevertheless, when tribes have code and customs for establishing paternity, courts should consider it. Tribal codes are likely
to have specific enumerations of steps for establishing paternity
like state standards or the proposed federal standard.190 Using
tribal custom could lead to some of the same issues of vagueness or
subjectivity as a reasonableness standard. However, tribal courts’
experience and procedures for incorporating cultural standards
into their judgements sufficiently mitigate this concern. Courts may
look to five sources for customary law: the parties to the litigation,
inherent knowledge of tribal judges, secondary literature about
tribal customs and tradition, people of the community (often
elders), and the written work of tribal community members.191
These same sources are available to provide cultural context for
establishing paternity. State courts have equal access to evidence of
tribal custom as tribal courts with the exception of the inherent
knowledge of the tribal judge. This requires more of a court than
simply examining the date of a form, but the additional efforts are
worthwhile because of the importance of maintaining Indian
families and Indian tribes.
Moreover, state courts should be willing to apply this process
because it represents the same fairness paradigm that led to the use
of the reasonableness and imperfectly fulfilled law standards.192
Courts permitted to examine tribal custom can uphold the
protections for a father who represents himself as the parent of his
child in a way that is recognized by his tribal community even
though he may not have completed all the requirements of state
law. This outcome seems more just because it avoids disproportionate consequences.

190. See, e.g., Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Family Support Act § IV, https://www.srmt
-nsn.gov/_uploads/site_files/FINAL_DRAFT_-_Saint_Regis_Mohawk_Tribe_Family_Sup
port_Act.pdf; An Act Relating to Indian Child Welfare, 13 Tribal Council Act § 2 (8.1.1),
http://www.snoqualmietribe.us/sites/default/files/icw_code_2015.pdf.
191. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 13
MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 89–91 (2007).
192. See In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 68, 417 P.3d 1, 24 (“Utah’s requirements
for establishment of paternity by unwed fathers are notoriously strict.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); id. ¶ 72, 417 P.3d at 26 (“This approach is consistent with ICWA’s
liberal administration.”).
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3. Accepting and encouraging variation
The most determinative ICWA case has been Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, and my proposed congressional
amendment appears to reject its key rationale and benefit:
uniformity. Recognizing the legitimacy of tribal law and customs is
a more important goal than uniformity. Because of different tribal
laws and customs, variation is a desired outcome, even the best
outcome. The U.S. Supreme Court supplied uniformity as a goal,
and it consequently must be secondary to Congress’s general policy
of tribal self-determination and ICWA’s specific methods of
helping Indian tribes to survive.193
Expecting and allowing variation is an integral part of the
congressional goal of tribal self-determination. Announced by
President Richard M. Nixon in 1970,194 this policy provides the
opportunity for Indian tribes to “promote their tribal economies,
build governmental infrastructures, provide law and order,
manage tribal natural and cultural resources, meet the healthcare
and educational needs of their members, and perform other governmental functions” “like other . . . sovereign governments.”195
This was a pivot away from the assimilationist, paternalistic, and
racist policies that the U.S. government previously pursued. ICWA
is one of many acts196 that recognizes tribes’ freedom and authority
“to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”197 Liberty
inevitably leads to uniqueness; such was the result with fifty
different states and such is the result with 567 federally recognized
tribes. It is incongruous for Congress to promote self-determination
with so much legislation, including within some provisions of
ICWA, only to ignore the opportunity to extend it by accommodating tribal paternity law and custom out of concern for
uniformity. Expressly looking to tribal law to establish paternity is

193. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2012).
194. Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of

Tribal Self-Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 17 (2015).
195. Id. at 3.
196. Id. at 46 (giving other examples of self-determination programs like Tribal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, community service block grants, Native employment
works, Head Start, and grants for battered women’s shelters).
197. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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another needed symbol that the U.S. federal government and
American society respect tribal sovereignty and culture.
Uniformity is still possible procedurally. All Indian fathers will
be able to establish paternity by looking to the same ICWA
amendment which will direct them to either examine enumerated
statutory steps for acknowledging paternity or look to the customs
and laws of their own tribes.
Moreover, variation is not inherently offensive to the principles
of Holyfield. The Court was not concerned about variation in the
rights of one Indian father compared to another; its concern was
that “different rules apply from time to time to the same child,
simply as a result of his or her transport from one State to
another. . . .”198 An Indian father’s rights should not be dependent
upon actors outside himself, such as the mother of his child giving
birth in another state. Under my proposal, the variation in the
father’s rights are controlled entirely by the father. He is always a
member of the same tribe, and so any differences between the tribal
standard and ICWA statutory requirements for paternity will be
constant. With the federal statutory options also serving as a valid
way to establish paternity, all fathers would be guaranteed the
same process to claim their parental rights.
C. Responding to Current ICWA Amendment Proposals
I am not alone in advocating that Congress act to correct ICWA;
Kevin Heiner also reaches this conclusion in his article, “Are You
My Father? Adopting a Federal Standard for Acknowledging or
Establishing Paternity in State Court ICWA Proceedings.”199 The
goal of uniformity guides his analysis and his proposed statute.
This is a good objective in light of Holyfield, but it is irredeemably
shortsighted. Heiner’s amendment would provide specificity,
certainty, and flexibility for fathers establishing paternity under
ICWA, but it would not eliminate different outcomes based upon
location of the father because three of its options for establishing
paternity under ICWA look to state law procedures.200 Thus ICWA

198. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 46 (1989).
199. Heiner, supra note 170, at 2151.
200. Id. at 2182–83.
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determinations ultimately lie in the hands of state legislatures, with
all the associated risks, rather than in the care of federal or tribal
actors. The father’s other two options of using genetic testing or
representing himself as the father through statements or financial
support are more demonstrative of a reasonableness standard.201
Having five options to establish paternity resolves the immediate
questions of what fathers should do, but these do not represent a
solution that encourages tribal self-determination, dignity, and
autonomy—a broader movement of which ICWA was only one
part. My proposal provides at least as much uniformity as Heiner’s
amendment because there would also be uniformity of the procedures to guide Indian fathers despite the variation. Heiner’s
suggestion would allow variation based on location while mine
allows variation based upon tribal membership.
While Heiner and I both agree that Congress should act, he
aptly indicates that the last serious attempt to amend ICWA in 2003
fell through.202 This does not produce great confidence that Congress will respond quickly. Nevertheless, the increased litigation
regarding the standards of paternity should be ample motivation
to act.
V. CONCLUSION
By enacting ICWA, Congress was remarkably active in its role
as the guardian of Indian tribes and families. This legislation was
especially appropriate because of the extremely troubling nature of
the problem. Congress’s solution was imperfect, however, because
of its silence about the definition of two critical words—acknowledge
and establish—as they relate to paternity. State courts have reacted
with three standards for establishing paternity. Current case law
shows that the courts must apply a state law standard. Nevertheless, Congress must speak again to correct the flaws from what
it left unsaid and to fix the problems that arise with a state law
standard. An amendment to ICWA that creates federal steps for
establishing paternity or that allows paternity to be established
through tribal custom and law is necessary. By amending ICWA,
Congress will give Indian tribes the space they deserve to vocalize

201. Id.
202. Id. at 2178.
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their own answers to critical questions—”Who am I?,” “To whom
do I belong?,” and “What are my responsibilities to those I love?”—
for their member parents and children.
Carlie Smith*

* J.D., April 2019, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. Special
thanks to Professor Michalyn Steele for supervising this Note and for inviting me to participate in the symposium.
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